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ABSTRACT 
 
The issue of service delivery in South Africa has been one of the main priorities for the post-
apartheid government since 1994.  Local government, through municipalities, has been 
tasked with the provision of services to citizens. In order to achieve this, the municipalities 
need to invest in massive infrastructure, both to address the infrastructure backlog inherited 
from under-investment in previously black communities as well as infrastructure to support 
economic growth and development across the full breath of the Republic. 
Based on the revenues available from own sources and intergovernmental transfers, 
municipalities are unable to meet their constitutional mandate and this creates an area of 
participation for the private sector.  Access to capital markets becomes an important source of 
funding that municipalities, in addition to borrowing from financial institutions such as 
banks, should aggressively pursue.  This is an area that the metropolitan municipalities in 
particular, should prioritise as they are in a better position to exploit, than the smaller and 
less-resources local municipalities.  Government can then focus on finding innovative ways 
of reining in the local municipalities, in as far as accessing capital markets. 
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CHAPTER 1: ABOUT THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter discusses the context of the study, lays out the research problem, the research 
questions guiding the study, the important gap in the literature, the research objectives 
resulting from the questions, and the envisaged and obvious significance of the research 
outcome. It concludes by presenting the outline of the study. 
 
1.2 Context of the Study 
 
The thorny issue of poor municipal service delivery is a reality that many South Africans 
continue to live with even in the new dispensation.  To a large extent the problem is one 
derived from the historically distorted and absurd inequality presenting as the legacy of 
apartheid.  A central pillar of apartheid was that of maintaining high standards of services 
offered by the government in white, and to a lesser extent, Indian and coloured communities, 
paid for in large part by depriving African areas (Neva Makgetla, 2007).  The greater 
proportion of economic resources was distributed and concentrated amongst the non-black 
communities with their relatively smaller populations.  This meant that by exploiting the 
taxability of these economically viable sub-populations, the apartheid government was able to 
invest in infrastructure that made service delivery for the select race groups much easier and 
attainable (Joseph & van Rensburg, 2002). 
Unfortunately this system left enormous backlogs and inequalities in access to water, 
sanitation, electricity and other municipal services (Neva Makhetla, 2007 page 147).  As a 
way of addressing this malaise, the post-1994 government has placed a strong emphasis on 
community and grass-root initiatives and participation.  Importantly though, local 
government is now viewed as a vital sphere of government, and has been allocated a range of 
roles and responsibilities with respect to social and economic development, under the general 
concept of Local Economic Development (LED) (SALGA, March 2010).  Local governments 
now face the dual challenge of having to provide basic service delivery to all citizens whilst 
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maintaining and / or improving the quality of existing services provided, especially in the 
formerly non-black communities (Joseph & van Rensburg, 2002). 
Through the Municipal Finance Management Act #56 of 2003 (MFMA), the democratically-
elected government aims to modernise budget, accounting and financial management 
practices by placing local government finances on a sustainable footing in order to maximise 
the capacity of municipalities to deliver services to their communities (National Treasury, 
2004).  To this end, astute financial management is seen as critical in optimising the process 
of delivering much-needed services with arguably limited and inadequate financial resources.  
Phillip Van Ryneveld (2006, page 2) argues that the process of constitutional change has 
enabled considerable attention to be directed towards the creation of a sound, overall 
framework of decentralization and to addressing infrastructure needs via the establishment of 
autonomous, financially stable local governments. 
Earlier the likes of Wunsch (1998) cited previous research findings that suggest that highly 
centralized and top-down service delivery is expensive, cumbersome, inflexible, adapts 
slowly to new information (if at all), and is prone to political abuse.  According to Klaus, 
Bahrinipour & Feusers (2008), decentralization is in contrast, regarded as an important step 
towards a democratic political system and more efficient service delivery.  Currently, the 
developmental mandate of local governments is implemented through metropolitan 
municipalities in the six largest urbanised and industrialised centres in the country. 
Outside the metropolitan areas, the local government mandate is pursued by a two-tier local 
government, namely 231 local municipalities grouped into 46 district municipalities 
(Atkinson, 2007).  The financing of municipal expenditure is made available from three 
generic sources, namely (1) own revenues raised through taxes or user charges assigned to 
them, (2) grants or other transfers from other spheres of government that are made either 
unconditionally or earmarked for particular functions or types of expenditures and (3) loans 
or equity financing arrangements that leverage resources from citizens and the private sector 
for public infrastructure investment (Savage, 2008). 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the capital funding facilities available to 
municipalities in South Africa, with a key emphasis on the municipal debt market in terms of 
the investment and risk characteristics of the debt instruments issued by the municipalities.  
Klaus et al. (2008) argue that given the importance of infrastructure for enhancing growth 
and hence, poverty alleviation, it is essential for government to increase spending on 
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infrastructure.  Unfortunately, government funds (which include inter-governmental funds 
and municipalities’ internally-generated funds) in developing countries such as South Africa, 
are usually scarce and / or limited, and this makes borrowing an important means of 
accessing additional funds to finance infrastructure services. 
The White Paper on Local Government (1998) recommended that municipalities should seek 
private investment to supplement available public funds, in particular for capital expenditure.  
In fact, current legislation prohibits the use of long-term debt to cover operational expenses 
incurred by municipalities, although the link between the operating and capital budgets 
provided through the interest payments on long-term loans and the maintenance of capital 
assets, both of which are functions considered as operational, remains intact (Joseph & Van 
Rensburg, 2002).  Klaus et al. (2008) further assert that municipal borrowing improves local 
governance, particularly accountability, transparency and financial management at the local 
government level.  This assertion was made on the assumption that the exposure of local 
governments to capital markets requires municipalities to be transparent and leads lenders to 
exert a certain control function on local government finances (i.e., it fosters best practice 
governance within municipalities). 
Of particular interest is the development of the municipal debt market post – 1994 and how it 
impacts on the ability of the municipalities to meet their constitutional mandate through 
borrowing.  This market has been in existence for a while, but pre – 1994, it was operated 
under a prescribed investment regime that required that a significant portion of institutional 
investor funds, be allocated to government investments.  In return the national government 
would offer guarantees on repayment that were abolished, resulting in a significant number of 
private investors pulling out of the municipal bond market (Mantsho & Blaauw, 2009). 
1.3 Research Problem 
 
Municipalities in South Africa can only borrow for capital expenditure, meaning that 
municipalities can only access the debt markets for capital project funding purposes.  The 
bulk of the borrowing is, however, concentrated on a few, bigger municipalities that are 
perceived to be creditworthy, with many municipalities not having access to private capital at 
all (Klaus et al., 2008).  Borrowing levels have tended to be low across municipalities except 
in the metros.  The reasons for this low borrowing may undermine the realization and 
rationale for some of the financial reforms that have been introduced (SALGA, 2010). 
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Currently bank credits and municipal bonds are the two main financing instruments of sub-
national borrowing in South Africa.  A significant lack of requisite knowledge of the 
investment and risk characteristics of these debt instruments deployed by the municipalities 
for capital funding purposes, makes it difficult for municipalities to live up to their prescribed 
mandate – i.e., effective and efficient service delivery, economic growth, and redressing the 
legacy of the enduring injustice / inequities of apartheid. This lack of knowledge further 
impedes the necessary know-how on reformation of local debt markets and / or the how-to of 
exploring complementary sources of capital projects funding. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 
The attendant research questions flowing from the need to resolve the identified research 
problem can be articulated as follows: 
 How liquid and marketable are these debt securities (i.e., the state of debt markets in 
South Africa)? 
 What is the average term to redemption (maturity) on the debt instruments and is this 
compatible with the long-term nature of capital (infrastructure) projects? 
 What are the rates of return (cost of capital) on these debt instruments and how do 
they compare to one another? 
 Has the perceived level of riskiness, in particular the risk of default, following the 
removal of the central government guarantees on municipal bonds increased since 
1994? 
 
1.5 Research Objectives  
 
Systematic effort at attempting to answer the above research questions leads to these 
identifiable research objectives. 
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 To establish whether the investigation into the investment and risk characteristics 
explains the prevailing trend in the development of the municipal debt market in 
South Africa.  The investment and risk characteristics of interest and relevance in this 
case include: 
1) the yield available on debt instruments available to municipalities, 
2) the type and level of security offered,  
3) the average term to redemption and  
4) the liquidity and/or marketability of the instrument. 
 To investigate the municipalities’ preference for capital funding methods and the 
reasons for that preference 
 Further analyse which debt instruments are more viable given the type of 
municipality; i.e., whether the preferences outlined above, differ for metropolitan 
municipalities versus the lower-ranking municipalities 
 Based on the observations made by various authors, it has been suggested that due to 
the political transition process, municipal borrowing has largely dried up (Klaus et al., 
2008).  The paper will investigate what the impact of the removal of explicit 
government guarantees that had existed prior to 1994 entails for the development of 
the municipal bond market and public debt market in general. 
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
 
According to Klaus et al. (2008), the metros in South Africa not only account for the bulk of 
municipal borrowing in absolute terms, but on average they also have a higher debt per capita 
ratio.  They argue that the size of municipalities is not the main influencing factor for the 
engagement with borrowing, there are also some smaller municipalities that in fact finance a 
substantial amount of their capital expenditure through borrowing.  A host of reasons such as 
poor financial management, a lack of technical and project implementation capacity, failure 
to implement and enforce the various pieces of legislation passed since 1994, have been cited 
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by various authors such as Klaus et al. (2008) & Brown, Motsoane & Liu (2013), as being the 
main bottlenecks for municipal borrowing. 
As stated in the research objectives, the paper will make a significant contribution by 
highlighting the reasons and the factors that have resulted in the stagnation or sub-par 
performance of the municipal debt market (and the domestic debt market in general).  
Secondly, lessons from the more developed debt market of the metropolitan municipalities 
that can be adopted by the lower-ranking municipalities to reduce their over-reliance on 
government grants. Finally, the study can inform alternative or complementary forms of 
capital funding mechanism resident or possible within the current domestic debt market. 
1.7 Outline of the Study 
 
The study has firstly provided an introduction, context of key issues, research problems, 
objectives and questions. Chapter 2 will provide literature review on the use of debt markets 
in infrastructure financing in South Africa.  The review will also include the experience of 
other emerging economies and the challenges faced in this area of their governance program.  
The chapter develops an insight on the existing gaps in the literature.  Chapter 3 presents the 
research methodology and discusses the research design, as well as the sources of data.  
Chapter 4 analyses and presents the results of the study. Chapter 5 discusses the results and 
draws conclusions, as well as make recommendations and suggestions for further study. 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Amongst the many challenges that developing countries face, the two main ones are that of 
reducing poverty and enhancing economic growth.  According to Klaus et al. (2008) it is both 
economic infrastructure such as electricity, roads, water and sanitation, and social 
infrastructure such as health and education that are crucial for economic growth in 
developing countries.  They further argue that the contribution that the infrastructure makes 
in reducing poverty will spur the achievement of the Millenium Development Goals of the 
United Nations (MDGs), to which South Africa is a willing signatory (Stats SA, 2013).  For 
instance, by providing clean and safe drinking water, both mortality and morbidity rates are 
greatly reduced.  A healthier citizenry makes for a more productive one, which bodes well for 
economic prosperity and hence, job-creation.  To this end, Freire & Petersen (2004) argue 
that these long-lived facilities are important for building healthier, better-served populations 
and for creating competitive economies. 
An econometric study conducted by Kumo (2012) found that there is a strong relationship 
between economic infrastructure investment and GDP growth that runs both ways, implying 
that in South Africa, the economic infrastructure investment drives the long-term economic 
growth whilst improved growth feeds back into more public infrastructure investment.  The 
infrastructure requirements of OECD countries and the non-member BRICS countries are 
growing.  Raising capital for investment in infrastructure facilities is a universal concern in 
developing and transitioning economies.  Central projections for the next two decades or so 
suggest that the world economy is set to grow on average at close to 3% per annum to 2030, 
with developing countries’ performance outstripping that of the developed countries by a 
wide margin, 4% per annum versus 2.4% per annum (World Bank, 2007).  The two-way 
street, along which economic growth encourages demand for infrastructure, and infrastructure 
generates economic growth, is set to get much busier in the years to come (OECD, 2007, 
page 20). 
Despite the economic and social benefits to be derived, infrastructure spending falls way 
below what is needed, resulting in a huge infrastructure investment gap.  In South Africa the 
current levels of infrastructure spending are closer to 8% of GDP.  Actual government 
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spending on infrastructure over the 2010/11 to 2012/13 Medium Term Expenditure (MTEF) 
period has fallen short of budget, with R 642 billion spent over the three years, against a 
target of R 846 billion in 2010 (2010/11 budget review).  The need to address this under-
spending of 76% of the total planned infrastructure budget was mentioned as a priority in the 
implementation of the NDP, by the Minister of Finance in his 2013 budget speech.  Looking 
forward to the 2013/14 to 2015/16 MTEF period, planned expenditure on infrastructure totals 
R827 billion.  The gap accounts for more than 22% of the total MTEF budget period (KPMG, 
2013). 
The OECD (2007) report suggests that despite growing pressures on public budgets, general 
and local taxes, in the form of inter-governmental grants and own-revenue income of 
municipalities in South Africa, respectively, will continue to provide the most important 
sources of infrastructure financing.  However, public budgets fed by taxes will not suffice to 
bridge the infrastructure gap, coupled with the South African government’s lacklustre track-
record regarding spending on infrastructure.  Infrastructure has all the characteristics of a 
public good; non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption.  Given its importance for 
poverty eradication, its provision remains essentially the domain of the government.  But as 
previously stated, the inadequacy of state financial resources, make a case for private sector 
participation, to the extent that it complements the role that government plays in the provision 
of services (Klaus et al., 2008). 
They further contend that private sector participation is premised on the existence of liquid 
local capital markets and sound financial institutions that are able to channel local savings to 
the respective investments.  The importance of this to local governments derives from the fact 
that they are unlikely to access international capital markets and should therefore, not have to 
bear the currency risks that come along with it (Klaus et al., 2008).  Except for certain types 
of facilities (e.g. electric power, ports, airports and telecommunications), most sub-national 
governments have little access to foreign currency funds, and hence they deal exclusively in 
domestic currency for their revenues and expenditure (Freire & Petersen, 2004). 
Furthermore, David Savage, (2008, page 15) argues that borrowing from private capital 
markets to finance infrastructure investment is generally seen as an efficient way to finance 
capital programmes for reasons of the inherent lumpiness of capital spending, 
intergenerational equity and the governance benefits seen to result from having to negotiate 
funding from private parties.  Skeptics, on the other hand argue that sub-national borrowing 
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bears a high risk of over-borrowing, leading eventually to macroeconomic instability (Klaus 
et al., 2008, page 11). 
The literature review below first looks at the need for and the observed trend in the 
devolution / decentralization of the responsibilities for infrastructure delivery from the South 
African central government to the local governments.  Section 2.2.1 looks at the regulatory 
framework within which devolution takes place.  Section 2.2.2 deals with the challenges 
imposed by devolution on local governments.  Section 2.2.3 looks at how the constitutional 
mandate of decentralizing service delivery highlights the need for sub-national borrowing.  
Section 2.3 then takes a look at the structure of the overall debt markets in South Africa.  In 
particular Section 2.4 looks at the structure of the Municipal debt market and the supporting 
regulatory environment.  Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 outline the demand-side and the supply-
side of the Municipal debt market, respectively.  Lastly Section 2.5 deals with the 
characteristics of and the relations between public and private debt markets in South Africa. 
 
2.2 Political and Fiscal Devolution (Decentralization) of Control 
 
Devolution is by definition the process by which a central government gives power, 
authority, property, and so on, to local groups or governments.  Freire & Petersen (2004) 
define devolution as the granting of greater political and fiscal revenue and spending 
responsibility to sub-national units of government and the performance of more government 
functions at the sub-national level.  In particular Klaus et al. (2008) note that over the last two 
decades, countries throughout the world have been decentralizing responsibilities for 
infrastructure delivery from the central state to lower spheres of government.  The political 
argument underlying this move is based on the principle of subsidiarity, according to which, 
in a democracy, the lowest level of government that can determine and effectively meet the 
needs of its constituency is the most appropriate structure of government (Freire & Petersen, 
2004, Klaus et al., 2008).  To the economist, the arguments are as follows: 
 The sub-national government’s greater knowledge of sub-national needs strengthens 
the links between tax revenues and spending benefits that accrue to sub-national 
taxpayers. 
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 Sub-national authorities can respond more readily and effectively to local conditions, 
resulting in improved delivery of government services. 
 Bringing expenditure assignments closer to revenue sources enhances accountability 
and transparency (Freire & Petersen, 2004, page 11). 
Essentially the arguments in favour, both political and fiscal, suggest that decentralization 
strengthens democracies and increases efficiencies in the provision of services at the local 
level and that may result in reduced transaction costs.  The details of the extent and 
effectiveness of devolution are specific to each country and in particular, Klaus et al. (2008) 
contend that in developing countries not all spheres of government have the same technical 
and administrative capacity to ensure that the aforementioned benefits of devolution are 
realized.  Ultimately, however, a well-designed decentralization that is adapted to a country’s 
specificities is likely to positively affect infrastructure service delivery (Klaus et al., 2008, 
page 17). 
 
2.2.1 Decentralization in South Africa and the regulatory framework 
 
Decentralization is not a recent phenomenon in South Africa, but from 1996 the Constitution 
established a new system.  South Africa has had a decentralized system since the foundation 
of the Union of South Africa in 1910.  Before the democratic transition in 1994, two separate 
forms of decentralization existed along racial lines: on one hand white local governments and 
on the other hand black local governments, including the autonomous “native reserves” of the 
black population (Klaus et al., 2008, page 23).  The resultant infrastructure investment 
patterns were such that the levels and quality of services were highly differentiated between 
racial group areas and across the country.  This variation was also accompanied by a pattern 
of duplication and spatial dislocation of investment (Savage, 2008).  He alleges that this was 
evidenced by the fact that in racially segregated towns and cities, bulk infrastructure (such as 
water and treatment works) was often duplicated, while in former homelands high levels of 
service were occasionally installed to showcase the benefits of separate development. 
As a way of building an effective system of decentralization, there are now 3 spheres of 
government: national, provincial and local government, with the local government consisting 
of municipalities covering the entire territory of the Republic of South Africa.  Local 
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government was established as an autonomous sphere of government with executive and 
legislative powers vested in its Municipal Council (Brown et al., 2013).  The most important 
pieces of legislation regulating local government are the following: 
Constitution (1996) 
“The Constitution has granted municipalities authority to govern the local government affairs 
of their communities without interference from either the national or provincial governments.  
A municipality must: 
 structure and manage its administration, and budgeting and planning processes to give 
priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic 
development of the community; and 
 participate in national and provincial development programmes. 
In turn, the national and provincial governments must support and strengthen the capacity of 
municipalities to manage their affairs, to exercise their powers and to perform their 
functions.” 
These are the following categories of municipality (van Ryneveld, 2006; Atkinson, 2007): 
 Category A: A municipality that has exclusive municipal executive and legislative 
authority in its area.  There are six (6) metropolitan (“metros”) municipalities. 
 Category B: A municipality that shares municipal executive and legislative authority 
in its area with a category C municipality within whose area it falls.  There are 231 
local municipalities. 
 Category C: A municipality that has municipal executive and legislative authority in 
an area that includes more than one municipality.  There are 46 district municipalities 
which typically include several local municipalities within their borders. 
“Chapter 13 of the Constitution deals with all financial aspects of the various spheres of 
government, including local government.  In particular the Constitution details the various 
sources of local government funding as follows: 
From the national government, a local government is entitled to: 
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 an equitable share of revenue raised nationally to enable it to provide basic services 
and perform the functions allocated to it; and 
 may receive other allocations from national government revenue, either conditionally 
or unconditionally. 
 
Deriving from its municipal fiscal powers, a municipality may impose: 
 rates on property and surcharges on fees for services provided by or on behalf of the 
municipality; and 
 if authorised by national legislation, other taxes, levies and duties appropriate to local 
government, but no municipality may impose income tax, value-added tax, general 
sales tax or customs duty. 
 
A Municipal Council, may in accordance with national legislation: 
 raise loans for capital or current expenditure for the municipality, but loans for current 
expenditure may be raised only when necessary for bridging purposes during a fiscal 
year; and 
 bind itself and a future Council in the exercise of its legislative and executive 
authority to secure loans or investments for the municipality.” 
What the Constitution has done is to entrench the autonomy of local government by 
prohibiting any actions by national and provincial governments that might compromise or 
interfere with the ability of a municipality to discharge its constitutional obligations (Brown 
et al., 2013). 
 
White Paper on Local Government (1998) 
“The White Paper on Local Government introduces the concept of “Developmental Local 
Government” as the central responsibility of municipalities to work together in a co-operative 
way that implies an ongoing negotiation process with local communities to find sustainable 
ways to meet their needs and improve the quality of their lives.  According to the paper, a 
developmental local government will have the following interrelated characteristics: 
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a. Maximising social development and economic growth 
b. Integrating and coordinating the efforts of the various agents such as provincial 
departments, community groups and private sector institutions that play a role in 
achieving local prosperity 
c. Democratising development by promoting the involvement of local citizens and 
community groups in the design and delivery of municipal programmes. 
d. Building the type of political leadership that will ensure that knowledge and 
information is acquired easily and speedily, thus promoting continuous learning” 
The implications are for example, that the provision of household infrastructure is the central 
contribution made by local government to social and economic development.  This includes 
services such as water, sanitation, local roads, storm water drainage, refuse collection and 
electricity.  These are services for which the municipalities collect large amounts of money in 
rates, user charges and fees.  In order to provide these services, the municipalities buy goods 
and services and pay salaries, thus contributing directly to the flow of money in the local 
economy (White Paper, 1998). 
Furthermore, through integration and coordination, municipalities should actively develop 
ways to leverage resources and investment from both the public and private sectors to meet 
their development targets.  A review by the South African National Treasury (2001) of the 
White Paper, cited by Brown et al. (2013) stresses that the importance of private sector 
investors is not only because they bring additional funding to the national table, but also 
because they tend to have better expertise of evaluating projects and credit risk and for 
managing outstanding loans than do public sector lenders.  In this regard, a developmental 
role for local government offers substantive benefits to local residents, communities, 
provincial and national spheres of government and the nation as a whole (White Paper, 1998, 
page 26). 
 
2.2.2 The challenges imposed by devolution on sub-national governments 
 
The constitutional mandate has unfortunately put massive pressure on local governments to 
deliver services (Klaus et al., 2008).  Freire and Peterson (2004) contend that in order for the 
sub-national governments to meet this mandate, they must first have the ability to raise and 
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use resources and to make binding commitments that are politically sustainable.  In South 
Africa, some of the challenges present as follows: 
Firstly the Municipal Demarcation Act of 1998 triggered the restructuring and consolidation 
of the municipal landscape, resulting in the ultimate formation of 283 municipalities in South 
Africa (Klaus et al., 2008).  The amalgamation process integrated poor and wealthy urban 
communities, and created cities that brought together business hubs, wealthy suburbs and 
townships under one administration (Brown, Motsoane & Liu, 2013 & Freire & Petersen, 
2004).  This was done with the intention to generate revenues from the core cities that could 
be used to extend much-needed municipal services to the underserved areas.  Makgetla 
(2007) acknowledges that the process of demarcation went a long way in setting up a unified 
fiscal and political basis for neighbouring black and white communities. 
The symmetric allocation of functions within spheres of government has, however, been 
criticised for failing to recognise the significant variation between individual municipalities 
in terms of investment needs, appropriate investment standards and institutional capabilities 
(Savage, 2008).  For example, a metropolitan municipality such as the City of Tshwane must 
subject itself to the same project-based approval process that applies to its poor rural 
counterpart, to use infrastructure grant funds from national government despite it already 
managing self-funded capital projects of a significantly greater size and complexity (Savage, 
2008, page 10).  To this end, Atkinson (2007) suggests that there will be major upheavals to 
the attainment of the developmental local government that are caused by the demarcation 
whose real impact will be felt for years. 
Secondly, the need for infrastructure investment is itself colossal, given the backlogs that 
resulted from inadequate investment made during the apartheid years.  In fact, the apartheid 
backlogs meant that South Africa remained noticeably behind comparable economies in 
providing basic infrastructure.  According to the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) data in the early 2000s South Africa ranked 49th in the world on GDP per capita, but 
only around 75th on access to improved sanitation and water (Makgetla, 2007).  Another 
phenomenon that added to the increased need for new infrastructure, was that of both rural-
urban migration and the large-scale provision of small Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) houses after 1994.  The shift resulted in a rapid fall in the average African 
household size, whilst the number of households rose faster than the population (Makgetla, 
2007; Brown et al., 2013). 
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Thirdly, municipalities derive their income from three sources: own-source revenues, grants 
from national government, and borrowing.  According to the analysis provided by Makgetla 
(2007), there are two fundamental problems with this income derivation and distribution that 
disadvantages the poorer municipalities in relation to the formerly white municipalities.  
Firstly even after 1994, municipalities are expected to raise the bulk of their income from 
own rates and taxes, with only a limited national subsidy.  Given that in the former 
homelands, household incomes are low, this means that revenues raised locally by the 
municipalities tend to be significantly inadequate.  Secondly, national subsidies tended to be 
still higher for the richer municipalities.  The reason is that there was a tie between 
government subsidy and existing infrastructure.  That is, government grants were linked to 
maintenance and current costs of historic capital expenditure.  This translated to the former 
homelands that had suffered from extremely low public investment under apartheid receiving 
lower government subsidies, even post-apartheid. 
In 2006, government did effect some fiscal policy changes, noticeably that of increasing 
transfers to municipalities and targeting the transfers more to the poorer municipalities.  This 
it achieved by implementing a new redistribution formula meant to increase the allocations 
and more so to the poorer municipalities, as already stated.  In the view of Makgetla (2007), 
the increased subsidies seemed unlikely to make a meaningful difference.  If anything, the 
local government budgets have tended to reinforce, rather than diminish, the spatial 
inequalities left by apartheid.  In conclusion, she thus argues that overcoming these 
inequalities would require a fairly substantial redistribution of resources to the poorest 
municipalities, over and above those achieved by national government to date. 
The points raised above highlight the fact that much as the decentralization of power goes a 
long way in strengthening democratic political systems and more efficient service delivery by 
giving more decision-making power, it does place greater financial burden on the sub-
national government.  In fact the White Paper on Local Government does state that 
municipalities face immense challenges in developing sustainable settlements which meet the 
needs and improve the quality of life of local communities.  Klaus et al. (2008) lament the 
fact that in general, decentralization often results (unintentionally) in local governments only 
getting increased administrative or political responsibilities, but no fiscal autonomy.  They 
argue that funds spent on infrastructure service delivery by the local government, are 
dependent on the discretion of central government to transfer sufficient resources.  They 
further contend that the fiscal imbalance between responsibilities and financial resources thus 
16 
 
created, can only be remedied through higher own resource revenues together with the 
authority to borrow (Klaus et al., 2008, page 12). 
 
2.2.3 Devolution and the need for sub-national borrowing 
 
The constitutional mandate of decentralizing service delivery to local government has placed 
an enormous burden on municipalities in South Africa.  The mandate seeks to exploit the 
matching principle of local finance that emphasizes that the financial capacity of local 
governments should be aligned with the functional responsibilities delegated to them (Klaus 
et al., 2008).  Klaus et al. (2008) argue that this principle is often not met given that the 
increased responsibilities in providing services are seldom accompanied with an appropriate 
transfer of financing means and powers.  Unfortunately increased infrastructure 
responsibilities imply the need to invest in physical assets, and these physical facilities 
themselves, require massive capital investment.  This investment is done against the backdrop 
of what Freire & Petersen (2004), have termed a “hard budget” constraint at the local 
government level.  They define a hard budget constraint as meaning that the sub-national 
government must live within its resources and cannot depend on the central government to 
cover its deficits or repay its debts. 
The Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework 7 for South Africa puts the levels for 
capital expenditure for the 2009 / 2010 year at R 46 billion (DBSA, 2012).  This means that 
the infrastructure financing needs for South African municipalities will remain substantial 
over the next 10 years, estimated at approximately R 500 billion (Brown et al., 2013).  Of the 
three forms of income sources for the municipalities, the DBSA (2012) report shows that the 
metropolitan municipalities derive most of their income from internal sources, namely user 
charges and property taxes.  The lower ranking municipalities on the other hand, are heavily 
dependent on government subsidies, with insignificant funding from internal sources. 
The reason for this discrepancy lies in the fact that these municipalities do not get much by 
way of rates and service payments given that the residents are generally poor and cannot 
afford to pay for the services and / or most do not receive any municipal services anyway 
(Makgetla, 2007).  Supporting this observation, Van Ryneveld (2006) asserts that to a large 
extent, the metros are self-financing since they receive approximately 3% to 6.7% of their 
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budgets in grants, whereas, smaller and rural municipalities with weaker tax bases receive up 
to 87.3% of their budgets from transfers. 
According to Freire & Petersen (2004) the decentralization of services to local government 
usually renders the revenue sources at the sub-national level, inadequate to fund the services, 
thus inter-governmental transfers do fill in the gap.  There are three types of grants / transfers: 
the unconditional grants (based on the equitable share formula), the conditional grants 
targeted at infrastructure development (the Municipal Infrastructure Grant) and lastly the 
conditional grants meant for capacity building and restructuring municipal operations.  These 
transfers from national government have been increasing significantly over the years, with 
the DBSA (2012) report showing that the increase in the Municipal Infrastructure Grant 
(MIG), which represents the bulk of the transfers, is at a real rate of 14% per annum. 
Brown et al. (2013) argue that these sources of capital finance are insufficient to meet the 
estimated demand, thus expanding and deepening the sub-national credit market is viewed by 
government as critical to providing a long-term financing source.  Leigland & Thomas (1999) 
contend that the desirability of credit financing of facilities with a long lifespan, allows “pay-
as-you-use” financing where users of the facilities pay for them through taxes or special 
charges over the lifetime of the facility.  They argue that “pay-as-you-build” financing that 
relies on current tax revenues to finance construction, tends to put an unfair burden on 
citizens who enjoy little use of the facility. 
According to the DBSA (2012) the estimated total amount that municipalities budgeted to 
borrow for the period 2009/10 was R 10.7 billion of which the budget for the metros stood at 
R 7.9 billion.  Clearly at 74% of the borrowing requirement, the metropolitan municipalities 
dominate the municipal debt market.  This and the fact that they collect a substantial 
proportion of their own revenue, places the metros in a better position to meet their 
constitutional imperative of providing services to their residents, than the smaller and rural 
municipalities (Van Ryneveld, 2006).  He further asserts that in the metros, as well as in the 
richer non-metropolitan cities, there is in addition, considerable cross-subsidization of poorer 
households out of locally generated revenue. 
To this end, Wittenberg (2003) alludes to the fact that without the requisite fiscal resources, 
decentralization of administrative and legislative responsibilities will most likely, lead to 
unsatisfactory outcomes.  In particular, only some municipalities can actually realize the 
positive effects that borrowing can have on service delivery for their citizens (Klaus et al., 
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2008, page 37).  This certainly undermines the post-apartheid government’s prerogative of 
extending basic services to all citizens across the full breadth of the Republic. 
 
2.3 The Structure of the overall debt markets in South Africa 
 
Similar to business enterprises, governments issue debt to pay for expenses incurred on an 
ongoing basis as well as to finance major capital projects.  Government debt includes issues 
made by a sovereign state as well as local governments (OECD, 2014).  Debt is broadly 
categorised into private debt and public debt, where private debt comprises both bank and 
non-bank loan obligations, i.e. lending is not securitized.  Public debt generally covers all 
debt instruments that are (freely) trade-able on a public exchange or over-the-counter (Kale & 
Meneghetti, 2011).  Apparently the structure of the financial markets in South Africa is more 
developed and sophisticated than that in other developing countries and as such, it is highly 
regarded internationally because it boasts a strong regulatory and legal framework (Young, 
2013). 
South African organized formal capital markets comprise the JSE limited (which acquired the 
Bond Exchange of South Africa (BESA) in 2009, the Alternative Exchange (AltX) and the 
South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX).  The AltX is a division of the JSE, currently the 
largest stock exchange in Africa, and attracts a wide range of small and medium-sized high 
growth companies (Young, 2013).  The most important division of the capital markets is that 
of primary markets, in which new stock or bond issues are made and secondary markets, in 
which previously issued stocks and bonds are traded.  The importance of the secondary 
market derives from the fact that its existence increases the willingness of investors to 
provide funds in the primary markets (that is, it provides liquidity) (Hassan, 2013). 
The main entities seeking to raise long-term funds on the primary market are governments 
and business enterprises (Hassan, 2013).  Governments tend to issue only bonds whereas 
businesses often issue either equity or bonds.  In South Africa, government borrowing 
consists of issues made by the central government and local governments.  Provinces, 
although authorised to borrow, have been precluded from borrowing to finance capital 
expenditure, due to concerns over the low level of provincial own revenues (Savage, 2008).  
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Ojah & Pillay (2009) provide an overview of the South African capital (debt) market 
structure over the period 1980 to 2006 below.  
 
Table 1 : Distribution of economic entities listed on BESA 
Company Name 
No. of 
debt 
issues 
No. of 
debt 
issues 
No. of 
debt 
issues 
No. of 
debt 
issues 
Total 
issues 
% of total 
issues by 
issuing 
group 
  
1980-
1990 
1991-
1996 
1997-
2000 
2001-
2006 
1980-
2006 1980-2006 
Central government 4 13 5 102 124 26,33% 
Municipal bonds 0 0 0 4 4 0,85% 
State-owned enterprises 8 4 0 4 16 3,40% 
State-owned banks 0 2 1 2 5 1,06% 
Water authorities 1 1 3 9 14 2,97% 
Corporate sector 0 1 2 305 308 65,39% 
Total 13 21 11 426 471 100,00% 
 
From Table 1 above, it is clear that up until 2000 a significant portion of the capital debt 
market was dominated by the central government and state-owned enterprises.  From 2001 
the profile of the public debt issues changed significantly in favour of businesses and 
financial services companies.  The debt issued by municipalities, however, remained fixed 
over the period. 
The banking industry (private debt) which is regulated by the South African Reserve bank 
(SARB) is dominated by four local banks: Nedbank, ABSA, First Rand and Standard Bank, 
has become highly competitive, with the re-entry of some experienced foreign banks, having 
left at the height of the anti-apartheid struggle in the 1980.  In addition to the above-
mentioned bank, Capitec made a significant entry into this retail space.  It has made 
remarkably quick progress in gaining a share of this market, especially among the previously 
unbanked (Young, 2013).  The non-bank private debt market comprises development finance 
institutions such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the Land & 
Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa, and these institutions focus their loans on 
support for infrastructure and developmental projects (Young, 2013).  Other non-bank private 
debt markets contain finance firms, microfinance institutions, captive finance firms and their 
likes (in the form of trade credits and leases). 
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2.4 Structure of the Municipal debt market in South Africa and the Regulatory 
environment 
 
Other than intergovernmental transfers and own-source revenues, the third funding source for 
both growth-enhancing and backlog-reducing infrastructure need is debt capital, through 
bank credits (the private debt market) and municipal bonds (the public debt market).  
According to Van Ryneveld (2006), the broad goal in financing municipal infrastructure, both 
urban and rural, has been to create independent, financially stable, self-financing 
municipalities able to borrow from the private financial sector on a sound basis.  Klaus et al. 
(2008) compared the sub-national borrowing market in South Africa with that of other 
developing countries and found that the South African market is highly developed in these 
areas. 
Firstly, they found that municipalities can and do access capital markets on their own merits 
to finance infrastructure investment and have a long history of doing so, whereas in other 
countries, the sub-national entities are still largely reliant on the central government.  In-fact 
Brown et al. (2013) noted that since 2005, activity in the municipal debt market has risen 
rapidly, with long term borrowing particularly increasing significantly in the run up to the 
2010 FIFA World Cup.  As noted, however, the bulk of the municipal borrowing is 
concentrated on the metros as these are perceived to be most creditworthy.  Secondly, unlike 
other developing countries, intergovernmental transfers are rather stable and predictable, 
thereby affecting municipalities’ planning reliability Freire & Petersen (2004).  To the extent 
that long-term borrowing and lending, as suggested by the same authors is dependent on 
long-term predictability, these factors are reasonably adequate to promote municipal 
borrowing. 
The analysis of Klaus et al. (2008) identifies the prerequisites for the viability of sub-national 
borrowing as; a well formulated and comprehensible regulatory framework, the need for 
competitive lending institutions (both public and private) on the supply-side and lastly, 
credit-worthy municipalities on the demand-side of the borrowing market. 
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2.4.1 The Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) of 2003 
 
Klaus et al. (2008) assert that ideally, a regulatory framework should facilitate borrowing by 
sub-national entities by allowing these entities to engage on their own with financial markets 
to finance their projects.  Further to that, the framework should dictate rules that provide 
lenders with predictability, clarity and confidence when engaging in sub-national lending.  
Importantly, such a framework should regulate potential crises that may result from over-
borrowing for example, and also provide ways of preventing the occurrence of financial 
crises (Klaus et al., 2008).  For the municipalities to be able to borrow from the financial 
markets and to do so at reasonable rates, lenders need to be assured of repayment (Freire & 
Petersen, 2004). 
This can be achieved through the national government guaranteeing repayment of the loan, if 
local government finances are not convincingly rigorous as perceived by the markets (Van 
Ryneveld, 2006).  Mantsho & Blaauw (2009) commend the South African government’s 
approach to avoid providing any sovereign guarantees of sub-national government loans.  To 
this end, authors such as Makgetla (2007) noted how providing these guarantees led to the 
national government inheriting huge fiscal deficits in 1994, with the homelands having 
contributing significantly to the deficits.  They were able to borrow with both explicit and 
implicit guarantees from the then South African government (Van Ryneveld, 2006). 
Plekhanov & Singh (2007) argue that the South African sub-national borrowing market is 
controlled through a co-operative approach between the various spheres / tiers of 
government.  This legal framework uses an ongoing negotiating process between the various 
levels of government.  The strength of this approach is that it raises awareness among local 
governments about the macroeconomic implications of their budgetary choices, whilst not 
automatically implying a central government guarantee for sub-national borrowing 
(Plekhanov & Singh, 2007).  Contrary to this assertion, Klaus et al. (2008) argue that the 
South African legal framework governing sub-national borrowing lies somewhere between a 
co-operative approach and one that is market-based. 
Whilst agreeing to the co-operative component as noted by Plekhanov & Singh (2007), Klaus 
et al. (2008) argue that aspects of a market-based approach are evident when noting that 
municipal debt limits are authorized by a Municipal Council, with no perceived chance of 
central government bail-out, in the case of a default (at least in principle).  With the 
22 
 
abandoning of explicit national government guarantees in 1994, local governments are 
expected to borrow on their own merits (Freire & Petersen, 2004).  Unfortunately the removal 
of this financial back-stop, has created uncertainty regarding the credit-worthiness of the 
newly-created municipalities.  Furthermore, the demarcation process under the Municipal 
Demarcation Act of 1998, resulted in the amalgamation of wealthier and poorer regions, thus 
calling into question the stability of the fiscal strength of all municipalities, for example, by 
depressing ratios of revenue to population (Klaus et al., 2008; Freire & Petersen, 2004).  To 
the extent that long-term borrowing and lending depends on being able to predict the future, 
the increased (across the board) uncertainty has dampened private investors’ willingness to 
provide long-term funds (Klaus et al., 2008). 
A period of about 10 years went by during which sub-national borrowing was effectively un-
regulated, whilst extensive stakeholder consultation following the 1998 White Paper on Local 
Government, took place.  The end result was the enactment of the Municipal Finance 
Management Act of 2003 (MFMA), which together with other pieces of legislation such as 
the Municipal Structures Act (1998), the Municipal Systems Act (2004) and the Municipal 
Property Rating Act (2004), forms the foundation of the new local government system (Klaus 
et al., 2008).  It became the all-important piece of legislation that filled the regulatory gap 
that emerged from the abolishment of national government guarantees, insofar as the issue of 
financial emergencies.  According to Freire & Petersen (2004), the MFMA has three key 
parts: 
Financial management : The Act regulates the budgeting, accounting, financial reporting and 
supply chain management of local governments, requiring clear and consistently formatted 
information about municipalities’ financial status.  In addition the roles and responsibilities of 
all the relevant stakeholders, for example, the Municipal Council etc. are clearly spelt out, 
thus removing any ambiguities that may exist.  By dealing with information asymmetries, the 
Act increases transparency and hence increased efficiencies. 
Borrowing : The Act regulates short- and long-term borrowing by ensuring that long-term 
debt be used for capital expenditure, whilst limiting short-term borrowing to cash flow 
management within the financial year.  If there is a mismatch between the economic lifespan 
of a financed project / asset and the credit maturity, then there is an increased risk of under- 
or over-borrowing (Klaus et al., 2008).  They further noted that this has the un-desired effect 
of prohibiting borrowing for maintenance since maintenance of capital assets falls under the 
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operating budget.  So in essence, a municipality has to mobilise own resources to cover the 
maintenance of infrastructure. 
Financial emergencies : The Act creates a process, including an agency within the National 
Treasury, to deal with municipalities in financial crises.  This effectively increases certainty, 
predictability and confidence in the municipal debt system that should positively impact on 
investment decisions by lenders. 
To this end, it can be surmised that the Act does go a long way in achieving the aims of 
regulation that addresses the issue of information asymmetries created through uncertainty, 
and hence increases confidence in the municipal debt market.  According to Klaus et al., 
(2008), the regulatory framework does provide an enabling environment that supports sub-
national borrowing.  Their findings however, further revealed an interesting phenomenon; i.e. 
that despite the removal of explicit guarantees, there is a general perception that there is an 
implicit guarantee that might apply should a metropolitan municipality default on its debt 
obligations.  The too-big-to-fail (TBTF) phenomenon seems to apply to the metropolitan 
municipalities in South Africa, thus creating implicit bail-out expectations (Klaus et al., 
2008).  This implicit guarantee, no doubt introduces a tinkle about moral hazard on the side 
of the municipalities.  One would therefore expect rational creditors to factor this lingering 
information cost in their required return when lending to municipalities.  Yet, in all fairness, 
it can be argued that the design of any financial regulatory system can only be tested in times 
of financial crises. 
 
2.4.2 The demand-side of the municipal debt market 
 
The demand-side of the municipal debt market refers to the municipalities, as they are the 
ones responsible for infrastructure service delivery.  The credit-worthiness of the 
municipalities, defined as the likelihood that a borrower may default on their obligations, is 
an important demand-side requirement for municipal borrowing (Klaus et al., 2008 & Freire 
& Petersen, 2004).  A good or bad credit rating, as determined by a municipality’s credit-
worthiness, is important in attracting lenders.  Determinants of a credit rating reflect both the 
economic and fiscal health of the sub-national entity (Palumbo, Shick & Zaporowski, 2006).  
It is in the stability and predictability of a municipality’s income revenue that these factors 
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are reflected, irrespective of whether the funds are transfers from the central government or 
internally-generated (Klaus et al., 2008, Freire & Petersen, 2004). 
Another important factor influencing sub-national borrowing, is the size of a municipality’s 
budget, as logic dictates that bigger cities tend to have higher amounts of debt in absolute 
terms.  The reasons include the fact that a large budget size is attractive to lenders due to 
lower transaction costs, and the implicit bail-out expectation means that the metros are seen 
as relatively safe (Klaus et al., 2008).  As previously mentioned, the bulk of borrowing by 
South African municipalities is concentrated on the few, but bigger municipalities, with many 
other municipalities not having access to any form of private capital.  The analysis of Klaus 
et al. (2008) about the factors that underlie the demand constraints revealed some interesting 
facts.  Although a good credit rating and a municipality’s budget size, rank amongst the most 
important demand-side requirements, for the reasons outlined above, they are not the most 
critical factors. 
Firstly, the amalgamation and demarcation process together with the urban migration 
phenomenon outlined above, resulted in wage distributions that impacted negatively on some 
municipalities’ fiscal health.  For example, the relative size of a municipality’s tax revenue 
would reduce drastically, whilst costs resulting from increased demand for social benefits 
would increase (Palumbo et al., 2006), as poor and / or unemployed “migrants” from a former 
homeland are integrated into a former whites’ only administrative area.  They contend that a 
decline in the financial health will adversely impact a municipality’s creditworthiness and 
thus, its credit rating.  For this reason, Klaus et al., (2008) suggest that a municipality in this 
position, whilst wishing to borrow, will not want a credit rating. 
They further suggest that even well-performing municipalities may wish to borrow, but not 
be willing to incur the costs associated with obtaining a rating.  Secondly, under the Basel II 
regulatory framework, most banks use internal risk models to determine a borrower’s risk 
profile and as such, have no need for a credit rating when taking the decision of whether to 
lend to a municipality or not.  Thirdly, the evidence presented from the study conducted by 
Klaus et al., (2008) suggest that budget size and / or higher loan volumes does play an 
important role in a metropolitan municipality’s engagement in borrowing.  Of the sampled 
local municipalities, budget size was not an important influencing factor. 
These points highlight the fact that, much as a good credit rating and a large budget size are 
important demand-side requirements, there are other, more critical factors at play.  Factors 
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such as the lack of capacity, both in terms of financial management and technical capacity, 
weak income generation, insecurity and lack of predictability of future income stream and 
lastly, a conservative attitude towards borrowing, were cited as the major constraints on the 
demand-side of the sub-national borrowing market in South Africa (Klaus et al., 2008, Freire 
& Petersen, 2004). 
 
2.4.3 The supply-side of the municipal debt market 
 
The supply-side is on the other hand, made up of both public and private lenders.  According 
to Klaus et al., (2008) the supply-side requirements for a functioning sub-national capital 
market, are efficient lenders and innovative financing instruments.  Municipalities in South 
Africa have a long standing relationship with the major commercial banks, wherein the banks 
have administered their accounts and lend money to the municipalities.  In addition to the 
private banks, the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), a public lender with a 
clear developmental mission, has played a major and dominating role in financing 
infrastructure service delivery (Klaus et al., 2008).  With the national government being its 
sole shareholder, the DBSA as a financial institution, is exempt from some of the capital 
adequacy requirements to which other financial institutions are subjected. 
It is for this reason and other exemptions that the DBSA is able to perform its fundraising 
role for a lot less, thus it is (theoretically) able to lend to municipalities at cheaper rates 
(Mantsho & Blaauw, 2009).  Unfortunately this has resulted in the DBSA being viewed 
negatively by private lenders in general.  Within the context of decentralization, other public 
lenders such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank 
Group, offer currency loans and capacity building to sub-national entities, without any 
sovereign guarantees (Klaus et al., 2008).  The IFC encourages private sector development 
(PSD), as an initiative to promote economic growth and reduce poverty in developing 
countries by building private enterprises and competitive markets that are stronger and more 
inclusive (Worldbank, 2012). 
As an alternative to bank credits, issuing municipal bonds means that the municipalities are 
able to finance critically needed municipal infrastructure with domestic private capital, rather 
than through sovereign borrowing by national governments (Mantsho & Blaauw, 2009).  The 
26 
 
municipal bond market in South Africa is not new.  Prior to 1994, municipalities issued 
bonds under a prescribed investment regime, in which institutional investors such as Pension 
Funds were required to hold a portion of their investment portfolios in government assets 
(Klaus et al., 2008, Mantsho & Blaauw, 2009, Van Ryneveld, 2006).  According to Mantsho 
& Blaauw, (2009), the vibrancy of this municipal bond market was questionable given that 
there was no secondary market and no need for credit ratings either, as private investors did 
not see the need for the credit analyses of municipalities.  The post-1994 municipal bond 
market is emerging in the context of no prescribed asset requirements, no national 
government guarantees and certainly no tax benefits for municipal bondholders (Van 
Ryneveld, 2006).  The new conditions have created uncertainty that is resulting in the role 
private lenders play in the market diminishing (Mantsho & Blaauw, 2009). 
According to Klaus et al. (2008), the role of public lending institutions in the sub-national 
debt market is two-fold: Firstly, they should target borrowers that are unable to borrow in 
formal private capital financial markets with usually higher interest rates.  Secondly, they are 
expected to initially boost capital markets and crowd-in private lending institutions.  They 
further note that the problem with concessional lending with terms that are substantially more 
generous than market-determined loans, for example, that are achieved through lowering 
interest rates below market rates, is that there is the danger of crowding-out private financial 
institutions.  The issue then becomes the extent to which public lenders play a beneficial role 
in ensuring the right mix of both private and public actors that will create a self-sustaining 
sub-national financial market (Klaus et al., 2008, page 92). 
 
2.5 The competing and / or complementary relations between public and private 
debt markets in South Africa 
 
Freire & Petersen (2004) had noted that not only was the municipal debt market stagnating, 
the entire financial market’s structure was becoming steadily de-securitized.  This 
observation was made despite noting that unlike many other developing countries, not only 
does South Africa have an unusually high number of actors on the financing side, it also has 
an unusually high level of liquidity in this sector (Freire & Petersen, 2004, Klaus et al., 2008, 
page 109).  A closer look at the tension that has risen between the private and public lenders 
in the municipal credit market, has brought the role that the DBSA plays into question.  As 
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envisaged in the White Paper on Local Government (1998), both private and public lenders 
should complement each other, but as per the findings of Klaus et al. (2008), the lenders are 
actually competing and targeting the metros and the next top-rated municipalities.  They 
argue that this is justifiable in as far as the private lenders are concerned, given that lending to 
these municipalities is less risky and the scope for profitability is higher due to the large 
amounts of borrowed capital.  The DBSA however, cannot justify these competitive practices 
on the basis of this line of reasoning. 
The DBSA justifies its larger market share of this segment on the grounds that the 
government requires that the bank be self-sustaining and in order to do so, it has to earn high 
yields.  It further claims that the yields allow it to give subsidized loans to the lower capacity 
municipalities (Klaus et al., 2008, page 100).  Whilst the terms offered to borrowers are 
favourable, this practice is essentially crowding-out private lenders as they generally cannot 
match the rates the DBSA offers.  This trade-off (being self-sufficient and funding socially 
desirable investments) has according to Klaus et al. (2008) created a conflict for policy-
makers who are keen on creating a borrowing market with private players, whilst at the same 
time wanting to invest visibly and quickly to alleviate the accumulated infrastructure backlog. 
 
2.5.1 Comparative advantages of bank debts and bonds  
 
Klaus et al. (2008) noted that while bank credits are the common municipal borrowing 
financing instrument in South Africa, South African municipalities, post-1994, are reluctant 
to issue bonds.  This is in contrast to pre-1994, when issuing bonds was a common instrument 
for municipal financing.  The need to complement borrowing from banks by facilitating the 
development of a viable public security market can be justified by the benefits of increased 
competition and diversification that come with an increase in the supply of capital.  This is 
reflected in a lowering of the overall cost of capital (Ojah & Pillay, 2009). 
In addition, bond issuance with its many disclosure requirements, is seen as having a positive 
influence on local governance in terms of enhancing transparency and accountability (Klaus 
et al., 2008, page 87).  Whilst the monitoring function required to reduce agency costs 
associated with such transactions is duly performed by both banks and investors in bonds, the 
public character of bonds induces sub-national entities to live up to higher standards of public 
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disclosure.  In theory, this aspect should enhance the pricing process of secondary bond 
markets (Klaus et al., 2008) as well as act as a catalyst for further investment and increased 
liquidity of the bond market (Leigland & Thomas, 1999).  A major disadvantage with bonds 
is that they tend to have higher fixed costs of issuance than bank loans.  These costs accrue 
for road-shows, administration, costs of acquiring a credit rating and listing fees at the JSE, 
making bonds more attractive to the metros that are better suited to spread the fixed costs 
over a typically bigger loan amount.  This means that it becomes cheaper for a smaller 
municipality to borrow from a bank than to issue a bond (Klaus et al., 2008). 
Type of Issue / Level of security : Given the need that creditors have to know what remedies 
are available in the event of default, the type of debt instrument is best approached by 
examining the kinds of guarantees (collateral) that may be given by a municipal borrower.  
According to Freire & Petersen (2004), the fundamental distinction in classifying municipal 
debt is whether the sub-national government is relying on its taxing power and other general 
revenues to back the loan obligation (i.e. General Obligation or “Balance Sheet Obligation”) 
or when the obligation is limited to a particular revenue source to which the general sub-
national government credit is not pledged (i.e. Revenue Obligation).  In most countries, the 
general obligation is the most likely structure for capital expenditure for public safety, health 
and other similar activities that are not revenue generating. 
The revenue obligation would most likely apply to enterprises such as public utilities such as 
water and sewer, electricity distribution, local toll facilities, local ports and terminals (Freire 
& Petersen, 2004, page 51).  In South Africa, it seems that municipalities tend to prefer 
borrowing for general obligation, as they are able to decide independently how to allocate the 
money raised (Klaus et al., 2008).  They are able to cross-subsidize within their capital 
budget and this strengthens the municipality’s ability to choose what kind of infrastructure to 
finance.  The general obligation bond option gives a municipality wide discretion while 
subjecting its fiscal situation to bankruptcy threat and priority than the revenue bond 
obligation.  It can therefore, be considered more disciplining of municipalities.  The revenue 
bond, on the other hand, while tying creditors’ recourse to identifiable collateral, (that is, the 
financed project), offers municipalities obligations akin to limited liability.  Therefore, the 
onus is on the lender to determine whether or not the project is viable enough. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This section of the study deals with the design, population and sampling methods used in the 
study.  The method of data collection used for the study is detailed, followed by the tools and 
methods used in analysing the data. 
 
3.1 Research Design 
 
Trend impact analysis (also known as trend extrapolation) means looking at how a 
conceivable driver of change has developed over time, and how it is likely to develop in the 
future (OECD, 2007).  The driver of change in this case, is the entire overhaul of the political 
system in South Africa in 1994 together with the implementation of progressive legislation in 
the form of the Municipal Finance Management Act of 2003 (MFMA) that regulates sub-
national borrowing in the country.  This study is quantitative in nature using basic descriptive 
statistics to establish underlying trends.  There are qualitative aspects to it, such as informal 
discussions held with municipal staff and newspaper articles and reports read on the topic. 
 
3.2 Population and Sample 
 
3.2.1 Population 
 
The data used for the study was drawn from listed debt securities as well as the unlisted debt 
obligations of the municipalities.  The listed debt securities include corporate bonds and non-
corporate bonds, of which municipal bonds are a component, albeit not as significant, as 
illustrated by Ojah & Pillay (2009).  Essentially the split is between conventional bonds and 
inflation-linked bonds under both types of bonds as mentioned above.  For the purpose of the 
research, information on the non-listed debt market is restricted to the debt commitments 
municipalities have with commercial banks as well as the non-bank institution, for example, 
the DBSA.  The DBSA being the dominant player in this market, as stated in the literature 
review above. 
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3.2.2 Sample Size and Selection 
 
The research is intended to analyse the investment and risk characteristics of the debt 
instruments available to municipalities in South Africa since 1994.  As such, data was drawn 
(where possible) over the period starting in 1994 to the 31st October 2014.  For the listed debt 
securities, information was obtained from Bloomberg and I-Net Bridge datasets.  The 
information collected was trade data in respect of price and / or yield, the coupon rate, date of 
issue, term to maturity on the listed bonds as well as the type of bond. 
For the purpose of the research, it was important to collect data across the entire listed bond 
market in South Africa and not focus on the municipal bond market only, since this market 
remains small, underdeveloped and accounts for only 2% of total government bonds listed on 
the JSE (National Treasury, 2011).  A total of 391 records of listed debt securities was 
collected, 241 of which were corporate bonds and 150 non-corporate bonds.  The corporate 
bonds were made up of 173 conventional and 68 inflation-linked bonds.  The split of the non-
corporate bonds, was made up of 133 conventional and only 17 inflation-linked bonds.  The 
table below summarises the listed debt information. 
Table 2 
Sample size of Listed debt 
  
Conventional 
bonds 
Inflation-
linked bonds Total 
Corporate Bonds 173 68 241 
Non-corporate Bonds 133 17 150 
Totals 306 85 391 
 
For the non-listed / private municipal loan obligations, information relevant to the research 
was obtained from the Municipal Annual Reports as tabled on the National Treasury website.  
The Intergovernmental Fiscal Review (IGFR) reports were used to complement the 
information from the Annual Reports.  Interest rates such as prime lending rates by banks and 
other relevant rates such as the 3-month deposit rate used for the estimation of the liquidity of 
these loan obligations, were obtained from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and I-
Net Bridge datasets. 
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As noted earlier in the literature review, the bulk of borrowing by municipalities in South 
Africa is concentrated in the metropolitan municipalities (Category A), with the borrowing 
levels being much lower in the lower-ranking municipalities (Category B and Category C).  
On the basis of the World Bank (2009) report, it was observed and recommended that most 
district municipalities (Category C) are not in a position to borrow.  According to this report, 
those district municipalities with more service delivery responsibility, are those that are 
aligned with weaker and more rural local municipalities.  The recommendation is based on 
the assumption that such municipalities would in all likelihood, not have the financial and / or 
managerial ability required to meet any long-term obligations (World Bank, 2009).  It is for 
these reasons outlined that the information on loan obligations to the banks, as used for 
purpose of the research, was drawn only from the metropolitan and those local municipalities, 
for which such information is available in the annual reports. 
Given that there is a total of 283 municipalities in South Africa, it seemed beyond this 
project’s resource capacity to collect the data for the research from each municipality.  We 
thus obtained the debt obligations of two most dominant (in terms of volume of external 
capital sourced by municipalities) metropolitan municipalities and two local municipalities, 
the names of which have been withheld due to the sensitivity of some of the data items.  The 
data from the metropolitan municipalities obtained from the Annual Reports and IGFR 
reports was more comprehensive in the sense that it covered a longer time period and was 
more detailed in terms of the following characteristics, that are essential for our research; 
 Name of the financial institution that lent to the municipality, 
 Date of the loan issue, 
 Amount of the loan issue, 
 Term to maturity/Maturity date, 
 Interest rate/Cost of debt, and 
 Outstanding loan amount as at 31st October 2014. 
The 31st October 2014, being the latest date at which the data was available.  The data from 
the local municipalities was less informative due to the fact that it did not cover a longer 
period and it was less detailed in terms of how it was recorded. 
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3.4 The Research Design 
 
The trend analysis employed in this study uses an empirical approach to evaluate the 
underlying nature of the investment and risk characteristics of the debt instruments available 
to municipalities in South Africa.  In particular, descriptive statistics in the form of measures 
of central tendency such as the mean, median and mode of the data sampled are used to 
summarise that feature of the data.  Measures of variability and / or dispersion in the 
observed data are also summarised using statistical measures such as the variance and 
standard deviation. 
3.4.1 Liquidity of the debt instruments 
 
Liquidity describes the speed with which an asset can be converted to cash, without adversely 
affecting its price.  This definition implies that liquid assets tend to be characterised as having 
low transaction costs, are easier to trade, and large trades of such assets tend to have a limited 
impact on the market price of the assets.  Unfortunately liquidity is not directly observable, 
thus other measures are used as proxies.  The most common such measure is the bid-ask 
spread and turnover ratios (Sarr & Lybek, 2002). 
For the listed debt instruments: 
The price and / or trading data available on Bloomberg and I-Net, did not have bid-ask spread 
data and as such the trading turnover in the secondary bond market was used as a proxy for a 
liquidity measure.  The metric used is: 
Trading Turnover = 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠
 
For the non-listed loan instruments: 
For the non-listed debt obligations, the liquidity spread was measured as follows: 
Liquidity Spread = Prime Lending Rate – 3-Month Deposit Rate 
The method assumes that municipalities are able to borrow from commercial banks and other 
non-bank lending institutions at the prime lending rate and any short-term (3 months) funds 
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are lent to the financial institutions at the 3-month deposit rate.  It was not realistic to assume 
that the interbank rates would generally apply to municipalities. 
 
3.4.2 Average term to maturity 
 
For the listed debt instruments: 
The average maturity of outstanding bonds on the JSE at the calculation date, was taken as 
the arithmetic average of the maturity lengths of the individual bonds, computed as: 
?̅? =
1
𝑁𝑖
∑(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒)
𝑁𝑖
𝑖=1
 
Where 𝑁𝑖  is the number of bonds of the i-th bond type, for i = 1,2,3,4 based on the 4 
categories of bonds observed. 
N = 𝑁1+ 𝑁2 + 𝑁3+𝑁4 = 391 
For the non-listed loan instruments: 
The arithmetic average of the term to maturity for each loan advanced to a municipality was 
calculated as follows: 
?̅? =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
N = Total number of loans advanced to the municipalities. 
 
3.4.3 Rates of return (Cost of capital) 
 
For the listed debt instruments: 
For the listed debt securities, the yield to maturity (YTM) was obtained by solving the 
equation of value: 
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Market price of the bond (P) = Periodic Coupon Payment (C) * Annuity Factor + 
Redemption Value (R) * Discount Factor  
For the non-listed loan instruments: 
An arithmetic average of the cost of capital (interest rate payable) on each loan advanced to 
the municipalities chosen for the purpose of the research. 
 
3.4.4 Perceived risk of default (Credit Risk) 
 
In any form of credit extension, lenders and investors are exposed to the risk of the borrower 
failing to meet the required payments on their debt obligations.  As stated in the literature 
review above, the removal of explicit government guarantees from the municipal debt market 
in 1994, resulted in the credit-worthiness of the newly-created municipalities, being called to 
question.  The MFMA of 2003 became the all-important piece of legislation that filled the 
regulatory gap that emerged due to the removal of the national government guarantees.  The 
analysis in this research looks at a simple but sensible method that compares total municipal 
revenue and a proxy for the relative indebtedness of the municipalities, in order to assess their 
general capacity to honour their debt obligations. 
For the listed debt instruments: 
A good measure to assess the default risk on a bond is its credit rating.  The cashflow analysis 
in respect of the listed debt securities looks at the solvency ratios of the bond issuers to assess 
their risk of default.  The common metric used by credit rating agencies is the ratio of the 
value of total outstanding debt to EBITDA.  This ratio measures a company’s ability to pay 
off its incurred debt.  It gives an approximate amount of time that is needed to pay off all 
debt, ignoring the factors of interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.  A low ratio is 
desirable as it may seem to suggest that a company may take on more debt if needed. 
For the purpose of this study, the values are summed across the issuing companies for which 
data is available on Bloomberg.  The financial information required is only available for the 
corporate companies that have issued bonds.  Also, the information available did not cover 
the period under review entirely.  There is no such information for government and other 
35 
 
non-corporates that could be used in this regard.  The list of companies whose information 
was used to calculate the metric is provided below: 
Table 3 : List of Corporates issuing bonds with publicly available financial data 
Name of Issuing Company 
Airports Co South Africa Imperial Holdings Ltd 
African Bank Investments Ltd Letshego Holdings Ltd 
Barclays Africa Group Ltd Liberty Holdings Ltd 
Barloworld Ltd MMI Holdings Ltd/South Africa 
Calgro M3 Holdings Ltd MTN Group Ltd 
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd Nedbank Group Ltd 
Daimler AG SABMiller PLC 
Eqstra Holdings Ltd Sanlam Ltd 
FirstRand Ltd Sappi Ltd 
Group Five Ltd/South Africa Standard Bank Group Ltd 
Hospitality Property Fund Ltd Telkom SA SOC Ltd 
 
For the non-listed loan instruments: 
The data from the IGFR reports in respect of municipal finance charges per annum, were 
compiled in a more detailed form from 2003 to 2009.  There was no relevant information 
from 2009 to date.  An extrapolation was then done, based on an estimated retrospective 
measure of average growth rates dating back to 1994.  Based on the finance charges, an 
estimate for the annual amount owed to the banks by the municipalities, was derived as 
follows: 
Annual Amount Owed = 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑚
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
 
The prime lending rate was used as a proxy for the relative indebtedness, based on the 
assumption that this is the rate at which municipalities can borrow from the commercial 
banks (as numbering among the favoured customers of the banks). 
Summary 
This chapter has given an overview of the data sources as well as the various types of data 
used and that are relevant for this research.  Thereafter a systematic description of the 
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research design along with an outline of the methods and calculations used to address each 
research question, were described. 
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CHAPTER 4 : PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Over the period of review, Freire & Petersen (2004) noted how due to the presence of a 
private sector lender called the Infrastructure Corporation of Africa (INCA) in the municipal 
debt market, private sector lending exceeded public sector lending (made up entirely of the 
DBSA) and how it was concentrated on the metropolitan municipalities.  Since 2010, the 
National Treasury noted how this trend has been reversed with public sector lending 
exceeding private sector lending for the first time.  The reasons cited for this trend reversal 
included the withdrawal of INCA from the market in 2009 citing declining margins due to 
competition from the DBSA, as well the increased risk aversion of private lending during the 
recession (National Treasury, 2011). 
 
Another trend observed by Freire & Petersen (2004) was the changing nature of the 
municipal debt stock.  Municipal securities as traded on the JSE were declining whilst loans 
were increasing.  This trend was later confirmed in the National Treasury (2011) 
intergovernmental fiscal reviews.  According to the report, 64% of the total municipal 
borrowing comprised long-term loans, whereas securities in the form of municipal bonds 
accounted for only 30% and short-term debt accounted for 6% of the municipal debt capital.  
Municipal borrowing continues to be concentrated in the metropolitan municipalities, 
namely, Cape Town, Johannesburg, eThekwini, Ekurhuleni, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela 
Bay. 
 
This chapter contains the presentation of the descriptive analysis and the results obtained 
from further empirical analyses of the sample data. 
 
4.2 Liquidity 
 
4.2.1 Liquidity of the listed debt securities 
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The turnover ratio was computed separately for each of the 4 bond types in the analysis, 
namely: Non-corporate conventional, Non-corporate inflation-linked, Corporate conventional 
and Corporate inflation-linked bonds.  This ratio measures the extent of bond trading in the 
secondary market.  The higher the ratio, the more active, and hence more liquid, the 
secondary market.  Based on the observations tabled below, the turnover ratio was much 
higher (as a multiple) for non-corporate inflation-linked bonds.  The lowest ratio observed 
was for corporate conventional bonds.  The reason for this could be that, because these bonds 
are perceived as low-risk, they are thus often prescribed and traded for their safety qualities 
than other bond types.  For this reason, they are also retained for keeps in investors’ 
portfolios. 
 
From Figure 1, trading volumes for non-corporate conventional bonds seemed range-bound 
throughout the period of review, whilst the outstanding number of such bonds increased 
significantly.  There was, however, an increase in the volumes traded during the currency 
crisis periods of 1998 and 2001 in South Africa (The explanation is provided in detail in 
section 4.2.2 below).  The other increase is observed during the more recent global economic 
recession of 2008 / 2009.  Further clarity on these observations is provided in Appendix A 
below. 
 
The turnover ratio for inflation-linked bonds was higher than that for conventional bonds 
under both corporate and non-corporate types of bonds, as can be seen in Figures 5a and 5b 
below.  The same trend of the number of outstanding bonds increasing over the period under 
review as well as volumes traded increasing, is observed for all bond types.  The only 
exception is that of corporate conventional bonds in Figure 3 below, where volumes traded 
are decreasing over the period under observation, with a spike in the 2008/2009 period. 
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Figure 1 : Non-corporate conventional bonds 
 
 
Figure 2 : Non-corporate inflation-linked bonds 
 
 
Figure 3 : Corporate conventional bonds 
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Figure 4 : Corporate inflation-linked bonds 
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Figure 5a : Turnover ratios for linked bonds 
 
 
 
Figure 5b : Turnover ratios for linked bonds 
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The 3-month deposit rates obtained from Bloomberg and I-Net Bridge only cover the period 
from 1997 as illustrated in Figure 6a below.  The liquidity spread could thus, only be 
measured by comparing the prime lending rates with the deposit rates from 1997.  From 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14
Turnover - Corporate Conventional vs Corporate Inflation-linked Bonds
Corp_ILG Corp
0
4
8
0
10
20
30
40
50
Sep-96 Sep-98 Sep-00 Sep-02 Sep-04 Sep-06 Sep-08 Sep-10 Sep-12 Sep-14
Turnover - Non-corporate conventional vs Non-corporate inflation linked bonds
Non-corp_ILG Non-corp
42 
 
Figure 6b below it appears as though the spread remains constant except during the 1998 
global financial crisis that saw prime lending rates in South Africa reaching levels of about 
25%.  Except the period 1999 – 2000, the liquidity spread of banks (which proxy as a similar 
measure for non-listed debt obligations) hovered between 2% and 5%.  With over 80% of 
foreign investment capital in South Africa comprising portfolio investment at the time, South 
Africa suffered the contagion effect emanating from the massive withdrawal of portfolio 
investments from most emerging markets, following a decline in the confidence of foreign 
investors in the economies of several countries in Asia (Stals, 1999).  At that point, the spread 
was slightly negative at -0.13%, implying that banks’ cost of funding was exceptionally high, 
as is the case with a liquidity squeeze. 
 
The other sharp increase in interest rates followed the Currency Crisis of 2001, for which 
many reasons have been cited, such as the delay in the privatization of Telkom and the 
market’s interpretation of the delay as a sign of a lack of commitment to economic reform 
(Bhundhia & Ricci, 2006).  Other authors have cited the uncertainty and volatility resulting 
from the financial openness of the South African economy since 1994 (Mohammed, 2003). 
 
The average liquidity spread over the period under review was found to be 3.65% with a 
standard deviation of 1.60%.  A generally constant but positive spread implying that 
throughout the review period, with the exception noted above, municipalities could have 
borrowed from banks and other private debt market loan providers at a reasonably stable cost. 
 
Figure 6a : Prime lending rate vs the 3-month deposit rate 
 
0,00%
5,00%
10,00%
15,00%
20,00%
25,00%
Liquidity Measure
Average (Prime lending rate) 3-month Deposit Rate
43 
 
Figure 6b : Liquidity of the non-listed loan obligations 
 
 
From the graphs above, an inference can be made that the higher variability as observed with 
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resources are allocated efficiently (Saunders & Cornett, 2011).  To the extent that market 
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would be able to further trade these instruments.  The report contends that the limited size of 
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and this restricts the liquidity of the bond market in particular. 
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The liquidity in the banking sector, as confirmed by the results above, has ensured that for 
those municipalities that consider bond issuance expensive, rates offered on term loans, 
remain attractive.  The same observation was made by Klaus et al. (2008) and given that most 
municipalities in South Africa are small (i.e. Category B and C), except for the metros, this 
observation goes a long way in explaining the lacklustre revival of the municipal bond 
market. 
 
4.3 Average term to maturity 
 
4.3.1 Average term to maturity on listed bonds 
 
From Table 4 below, the average term to maturity is longer on non-corporate conventional 
bonds than on corporate conventional bonds, but slightly shorter than that on non-corporate 
inflation-linked bonds.  The terms on inflation-linked bonds are longer than those on 
conventional bonds in general.  A closer look at the data shows that none of the 
municipalities have issued any inflation-linked bonds to date and the longest term to maturity 
on any of the municipal bonds is 15 years, which falls below the average of non-corporate 
bonds, the class in which municipal bonds fall.  These bonds were issued by the City of Cape 
Town, City of Joburg and the Ekurhuleni metropolitan municipalities, with none of the local 
municipalities issuing any such bonds. 
 
Table 4 
Average Bond Maturities (in years) 
  Conventional Bonds Inflation-linked Bonds 
Non-Corporate 
Bonds 16 2/12 17 4/12 
Corporate Bonds 8 7/12 11 10/12 
 
4.3.2 Average term to maturity on non-listed debt instruments 
 
The average term to maturity on the loan obligations of the two metropolitan municipalities 
chosen is 14 years, 11 months.  This average falls below the average on non-conventional 
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listed debt securities as observed in Table 4 above.  It is also lower than that on some of the 
bonds issued out by the metropolitan municipalities.  It is worthwhile noting that the DBSA 
(which is a developmental government-backed financial institution) has issued loans to these 
municipalities, with terms as long as 20 years, whilst the average maturity for term loans 
issued by commercial banks is approximately 10 years.  The information contained in the 
annual reports, was not detailed enough to isolate the term to maturity on loans issued to the 
majority of local municipalities.  The reports detail the date at which a loan is redeemable, 
without explicitly stating the date at which the loan was issued. 
 
These observations are consistent with the literature in as far as the relative bond maturities 
and term loans offered by banks, is concerned.  The scope with which refinancing costs can 
be limited, can be influenced by how well the maturity of debt capital is long enough to 
match the cash-flow of the related infrastructure project.  Klaus et al. (2008) noted that while 
public banking institutions can offer longer maturities, commercial banks rarely do.  It was 
noted by Leigland & Thomas (1999) that in countries with mature bond markets, long-term 
bonds with maturities in the range of 25 – 30 years are offered, and these allow in particular, 
construction costs associated with such projects to be amortised over much longer periods. 
 
Other benefits include widening the potential of suppliers of capital such as pension funds 
with their typically longer-maturing, real liabilities (Klaus et al., 2008 and Leigland & 
Thomas, 1999).  Not only are municipalities in South Africa compelled to finance long life 
assets with medium-term funds, resulting in generally higher debt service costs, they are also 
forgoing the opportunity to attract cheap funds from institutional investors seeking to 
diversify their investment portfolios.  This was an unfortunate observation also made by the 
National Treasury (2011). 
 
4.4 Rates of return / Cost of capital 
 
4.4.1 Yield to maturity on listed bonds 
 
From Table 5 below, it is evident that at 8.03%, the nominal rate of return on corporate bonds 
is expectedly higher than that on non-corporate bonds (i.e. at 7.12%).  Again at 2.68%, the 
real yield to maturity on corporate bonds is higher than that on non-corporate bonds.  This 
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observation is in line with expectations in as far as explaining the existence of a corporate 
bond risk premium that compensates holders for the additional perceived risk of default over 
the risk-free rate of return. 
 
Table 5 
Average Yield to Maturity (YTM) 
  Conventional Bonds Inflation-linked Bonds 
Non-Corporate 
Bonds 7.12% 1.54% 
Corporate Bonds 8.03% 2.68% 
 
4.4.2 Cost of funds on non-listed debt instruments 
 
From Table 6 below, it is clear that at the fixed rate of 10.58%, the average funding cost is 
higher on loan obligations than that observed on listed bonds.  The average prime lending rate 
over the period of review was 13.93%, but it has been falling since reaching its highest level 
in 1998.  This is the cost of funding for the metropolitan municipalities that in theory, should 
be charged favourable rates by commercial banks.  The information from the annual reports 
was not detailed enough to extract the average funding cost for the local municipalities.  On 
the annual reports of the local municipalities analysed, there is scanty details about long-term 
loans issued at rates of between 10% and 15%.  Details of the issuing financial institutions 
and the terms to maturity, are not available.  With the attendant costs associated with the 
acquisition of data that is not publicly available, it is reasonable therefore, to assume that the 
cost of funding for the lower-ranking municipalities would be higher than that payable by the 
metropolitan municipalities. 
 
Table 6 
Average Funding Cost 
  Fixed Floating spread (over JIBAR) 
Mean 10.58% 2.30% 
 
The average JIBAR rate over the period of review was 8.56% with a standard deviation of 
2.67%.  The highest observed rate was 15.94% in 1999, that being the earliest date at which 
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the rate was tabled.  As far as floating rates are concerned, the same conclusion can be drawn 
that the average funding cost on loan obligations is higher than that on listed bonds.  As 
mentioned in the literature review, Klaus et al. (2008) contend that it should be easier for 
large sub-national entities to issue a bond, as they are better suited to spreading the costs 
associated with bond issuance over a typically larger loan amount.  These costs unfortunately 
tend to be prohibitively high for smaller entities.  Such entities would thus most likely resort 
to borrowing from banks.  The analysis above confirms this observation in as far as it applies 
to metropolitan municipalities. 
 
4.5 Perceived risk of default 
 
4.5.1 Risk of default on listed bonds 
 
From Figure 7 below, the ratio of the value of total outstanding debt to EBITDA for those 
listed companies that have issued bonds, starts off quite high, but drops significantly in 1996.  
The high value at the start of the review period, may be a function of the scanty data from 
which the metric was calculated.  The ratio is almost range bound throughout the review 
period, with a spike both in 2001 and during the global economic recession of 2008 / 2009.  It 
is worthwhile noting that the ratio is relatively high, but trending down quite significantly 
over the period of review.  The reasons may include the fact that the sample size was very 
small, since data available on I-Net Bridge and Bloomberg was only in respect of a fraction 
of those corporates from our sample that made such information public. 
 
From section 4.4.1 above, the cost of capital for corporates is higher than that for non-
corporates.  The use of this metric (i.e. debt-to-EBITDA) can be extended to the rest of our 
sample without any loss of generality, to suggest that it should be lower for non-corporates 
(i.e. treasuries and municipal debts), the class in which municipalities fall.  This seems to 
suggest that municipalities in South Africa, are in a position to take issue more bonds if 
needed. 
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Figure 7 : Total debt to EBIDTA for the listed companies that issued bonds 
 
 
 
4.5.2 Risk of default on non-listed debt instruments 
 
From Figure 8 below, there appears to be a semi-linear relationship between total municipal 
revenue and the estimated amount owed, over the period of review.  In monetary terms, the 
total municipal revenue is much higher than the estimated amount owed, with the (actual) 
rate of growth of total revenue seemingly much faster than the growth in the estimated 
amount owed.  This is consistent with a reducing cost of funding as proxied by a falling 
prime lending rate over the period of review, except in 1998 when it reached its highest level.  
The ratio on the other hand, seems to be trending upwards, only reaching a maximum 
(benign) value of 45% in 2004 (following the introduction of the MFMA of 2003) and also at 
the height of the recession in 2009.  Because of the need to extrapolate data to 1994, it 
remains unclear what the effect of the introduction of MFMA in 2003 had on the 
municipalities’ ability to borrow. 
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Figure 8 : Total estimated amount of municipal debt to total municipal revenue 
 
 
The empirical evidence in this regard seems to suggest that municipalities having not 
increased their borrowing in line with their revenue growth, should not be perceived as major 
credit risks by the financial institutions from which they borrow.  Indeed the results of the 
analysis confirm this assertion.  Of particular interest, is the observation made by Klaus et al. 
(2008) that municipalities in South Africa tend to prefer general obligation borrowing that 
does not involve the pledging of any particular assets as collateral.  Typically such borrowing 
is seen as low-risk, and should in theory, impact positively on a municipality’s 
creditworthiness.  The issue as raised by the National Treasury in the IGFR report of 2011, is 
that many municipalities utilize borrowings to fund social infrastructure, which costs money 
to operate, but does not expand a municipality’s revenue base.  The report asserts that this 
practice does impact negatively on a municipality’s creditworthiness, and to a large extent, it 
has reduced municipalities’ capacity to incur further debt. 
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CHAPTER 5 : DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
 
The study was conceived on the need to understand the prevailing trend in the development 
of the municipal debt market in South Africa since 1994, by analysing the investment and 
risk characteristics of the two main financing instruments of sub-national borrowing in the 
country, namely, municipal bonds and bank credits. 
 
On the question of how liquid and marketable the debt instruments are, both the listed bond 
market and the non-listed debt markets in South Africa proved to be reasonably liquid, thus 
ensuring allocation of financial resources at fair market prices.  This assertion is made 
cautiously in light of the fact that the testing of this fair-ness was beyond the scope of the 
study.  In as far as the municipal bond market is concerned, the lack of a developed 
secondary bond market has, unfortunately, undermined certain desirable aspects of liquidity 
such as being able to attract investors with a short- to medium-term investment horizon, who 
would wish to sell municipal bonds before their maturity date (Mantsho & Blaauw, 2009 & 
National Treasury, 2011).  The liquidity of the banking sector as highlighted in section 4.2.2 
above, however, seems to go a long way in explaining the interest municipalities have in 
financing their capital requirements using term loans. 
 
The average term to maturity on the listed bonds was slightly higher than that observed on the 
loan obligations.  Even though the bonds issued to date were issued with terms as long as 15 
years and considering that some loans issued by the DBSA had terms as long as 20 years, 
infrastructure assets tend to have a longer lifespan than the lives of the instruments used to 
fund their acquisition.  This mismatch has negative implications in as far as the cost of 
funding is concerned. 
 
The yield to maturity as reflecting the cost of funding was higher on loans than that on listed 
bonds.  As stated above, this applies to metropolitan municipalities.  These municipalities 
seemingly benefit immensely from economies of scale as the fixed costs that accrue with 
bond issuance are spread over typically larger amounts of borrowed capital.  For the lower 
ranking municipalities, the rates offered on loans have been favourable, due to the liquidity of 
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the banking sector and the price competition by the DBSA.  This assertion is made cautiously 
in light of the fact that the analysis in this study of the lower ranking municipalities’ 
financials, was undermined by the lack of data. 
 
The low perceived risk of default, as measured by the solvency ratios in section 4.5.2 above, 
seems to suggest that metropolitan municipalities in South Africa should increase the levels 
of borrowing in line with their constitutional mandate as outlined in the literature review.  
The rate of growth in the municipalities’ total annual review far outstripped the growth in the 
estimated amount owed, over the period of review.  Once again, the lack of data in as far as 
the lower-ranking municipalities is concerned, has been a major hindrance in reaching any 
firm conclusion as far assessing their default / credit risk.  Another area in which the lack of 
credible data has manifested itself, was in the study being unable to assess the impact of the 
removal of explicit government guarantees on sub-national borrowing.  Much of the data 
from the annual reports of the National Treasury’s IGFR was lacking, resulting in the need to 
extrapolate data to 1994. 
 
To this end, it can be reasonably concluded that the study has achieved its objectives, 
especially in using the investment and risk characteristics of the debt instruments available to 
municipalities to explain the prevailing trend in the development of the municipal debt 
market.  The study has confirmed the assertions made earlier by the studies conducted by the 
likes of Klaus et al. (2008), Freire & Petersen (2004), Mantsho & Blaauw (2009) and others 
that municipal borrowing in South Africa is stagnating, in spite of a supportive regulatory 
environment, a higher level of liquidity on the financing side as compared to other 
developing countries and the recent economic resurgence.  The National Treasury (2011) 
noted that following a contraction in GDP in 2009, the economy grew by 2.7% in 2010 and 
projections made then, were of a positive trend. 
 
5.2 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Freire & Petersen (2004) lament the fact that most municipalities in South Africa lack reliable 
and public accounting, budgeting and financial information that investors and credit rating 
agencies need.  They argue that this is one of the reasons there is a shift from securities to 
loans since loan origination itself becomes expensive as further analysis and possible 
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proprietary recasting of municipal financial statements are required.  This lack of data 
manifests itself more on the local municipalities than the metros.  Not only does it result with 
a higher cost of funding for much-needed infrastructure spend, it affects the ability to conduct 
proper analysis of a municipality’s financial standing that could be useful in establishing 
credit-worthiness.  The quality of data is slowly improving with each intergovernmental 
review, but it is still skewed towards the metropolitan municipalities.  A more informative 
analysis could have been achieved with a bigger sample of local municipalities’ information, 
obtained by “door-to-door” visits and interviews. 
 
The role of the DBSA has also been questioned, especially in light of the paltry support it has 
extended to smaller municipalities.  The National Treasury (2011) has commended the DBSA 
in the increasing role it now plays in the municipal lending space, but berates the crowding-
out of private lenders that comes with the concessionary rates it has offered.  The report 
together with the recommendations made by the likes of Klaus et al. (2008) suggest that the 
DBSA’s loan book should reflect a higher appetite for risk by focusing their lending towards 
the smaller and low-capacity municipalities that do not have access to credit markets.  Other 
areas that the DBSA could extend its developmental mandate, include providing technical 
support to municipalities to build their capacity to participate in credit markets (National 
Treasury, 2011). 
 
As a way of developing the municipal bond market in order for municipalities to benefit from 
potentially lower cost of funding and higher maturities, Mantsho & Blaauw (2009) have 
suggested the introduction of tax-exemption of municipal bond income.  A practice that has 
helped immensely in the development of the US municipal bond market.  The same authors 
have also suggested that South Africa could follow the example of India that has set up a 
fund that is used to pool together the borrowing requirements of smaller municipalities and 
issuing a municipal bond on behalf of the participating municipalities.  The development of a 
strong secondary bond trading market would also go a long way in enhancing the liquidity of 
the municipal bond market. 
 
The infrastructure backlog inherited from the apartheid past is enormous when compared to 
the main sources of funding prevalent in the South African municipal space, namely, 
internally-generated funds as well as intergovernmental transfers.  The space that borrowing 
can play in addressing the infrastructure investment gap, cannot be over-emphasized.  What 
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the analysis in this study has revealed is that there is so much room for borrowing, especially 
for the metropolitan municipalities.  Their borrowing capacity is much higher than they are 
exploiting and so is the potential to benefit from borrowing that is not readily available to 
local municipalities.  The government is looking at ways of enhancing the municipal debt 
market by making it attractive to private investors as well as finding innovative ways of 
reining in local municipalities.  The MFMA of 2003 goes a long way in providing an 
enabling environment that supports sub-national borrowing. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A Graphs for the liquidity measures for listed bonds 
Non-corporate conventional bonds 
 
 
Non-corporate inflation-linked bonds 
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Corporate conventional bonds 
 
 
Corporate inflation-linked bonds 
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Appendix B Graphs for the risk of default on listed bonds and non-listed loan obligations 
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